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NO. 42 SEPTEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Political Upheaval in Sri Lanka 
Internal and External Consequences of the Parliamentary Elections on 5 August 2020 
Christian Wagner 
The results of the 16th parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka mark a political upheaval 
in several respects. First, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), founded in 2016, and 
its allies now have a two-thirds majority in parliament. Prime Minister Mahinda Raja-
paksa and his brother President Gotabaya Rajapaksa therefore have a free hand to 
push through a new constitution. This will strengthen their power and the privileges 
of the Buddhist majority. Second, the poor performance of established parties – such 
as the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which 
have shaped political developments since independence in 1948 – seems to indicate 
a change among the elites. Third, the fragmentation of the Tamil parties weakens 
their recurring demand for greater regional autonomy. If the Rajapaksa brothers 
return to an authoritarian course, as they did during Mahinda’s last term of office, 
which ended in 2015, political polarisation will increase again, both within the 
Sinhala majority and among the minorities. 
 
In retrospect, the outcome of the 2020 
election will perhaps appear to be an even 
more profound upheaval than that of the 
1956 election. The victory of the then newly 
founded SLFP over the UNP gave Buddhist 
nationalism a voice, and its supporters sub-
sequently aggravated the conflict with the 
Tamil minority. Following the elections, 
the government and opposition will be 
made up of two parties that competed in 
a national election for the first time. The 
SLPP and Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and 
their political leaders have both emerged 
successfully from internal party disputes in 
which they politically marginalised their 
former parties – the SLFP and the UNP – 
and their elites. 
Changes in the Party Spectrum 
Within the UNP, Sajith Premadasa – the 
son of President R. Premadasa, who was 
assassinated by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1993 – prevailed 
over Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe 
as the top candidate for the presidential 
election in autumn 2019. In spring 2020, 
Premadasa founded the SJB, which was 
joined by other parties, including Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (JHU), the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC), and the Tamil Progressive 
Alliance (TPA). In May, there was a break 
with the UNP, which ran as a separate party 
in the election. 
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Mahinda Rajapaksa began his political 
career in the SLFP and was prime minister 
in 2004/05 before being elected president 
in November 2005 as a candidate of the 
United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). 
After internal party disputes, he was 
unexpectedly defeated in the January 2015 
presidential election by his former health 
minister M. Sirisena, who opposed the dic-
tatorial tendencies of the Rajapaksa family. 
The SLPP, which had only been founded in 
2016 by former SLFP and UPFA supporters, 
quickly became the new political platform 
for the Rajapaksa family. Basil Rajapaksa, 
Mahinda’s youngest brother, was a key fac-
tor in the SLPP’s success in the 2018 local 
elections. 
After Gotabaya Rajapaksa won against 
Sajith Premadasa in the November 2019 
presidential election, he appointed an in-
terim cabinet and his brother Mahinda as 
prime minister. Mahinda Rajapaksa had 
already been president from 2005 to 2015. 
His brother Gotabaya was the defence 
minister responsible for the military success 
over the LTTE in May 2009. 
In March 2020, President Rajapaksa dis-
solved the parliament. As a result of the out-
break of the Covid-19 pandemic, the elec-
tion had to be postponed until 5 August. 
The election campaign was dominated by 
the economic crisis, the security situation 
following the devastating attacks on Easter 
Sunday 2019, the growing tensions between 
the Buddhist majority and the Muslim mi-
nority, and the handling of the pandemic. 
Despite the restrictions caused by the pan-
demic, the turnout was 71 per cent. 
The victory of the SLPP was significantly 
higher than expected at just under 60 per 
cent. With the six seats of its allies – the 
EPDP, the TMVP, the SLFP, the NC, and the 
ACMC – it won a total of 151 seats, and 
thus a two-thirds majority in parliament. 
The changes in the Sinhala party land-
scape has also affected the minorities. The 
fragmentation of the Tamil parties weakens 
the demands of established forces such as 
Table 
Results of the parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka on 5 August 2020 
Party Seats won Seats by 
National List 
Total number of 
seats in parliament 
Share of 
votes (in %) 
Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP)  128  17  145  59.09 
Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB)  47  7  54  23.90 
Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)  9  1  10  2.82 
Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB)  2  1  3  3.84 
Ahila Ilankai Thamil Congress (AITC)  1  1  2  0.58 
Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP)  2  0  2  0.53 
Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)  1  0  1  0.58 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)  1  0  1  0.57 
All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC)   1  0  1  0.37 
National Congress (NC)  1  0  1  0.34 
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)  1  0  1  0.30 
Other parties  2  2  4  3.43 
Total number  196  29  225 100.00 
Source: Election Commission of Sri Lanka: http://elections.gov.lk/en/elections/PE_RESULTS_2020_E.html (accessed 14 August 2020). 
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ITAK and the AITC for greater regional 
autonomy. In contrast, parties such as the 
EPDP and the TMVP, which had emerged 
from opposition to the LTTE, work closely 
with the government in Colombo. The 
attractiveness of Rajapaksa’s election prom-
ises, such as better economic development, 
was also shown by the fact that SLPP MPs 
were elected in 21 of 22 electoral districts, 
including Tamil areas. 
Domestic Political Challenges 
The new government of Prime Minister 
Mahinda Rajapaksa includes five members 
of his family. In 2014, the Rajapaksas con-
trolled about 70 per cent of the state budget 
through the departments they headed. It is 
constitutionally questionable that President 
Gotabaya also held the post of defence 
minister. 
The biggest challenge is to revive the 
economy. Even before the Covid-19 pan-
demic, the country was in a state of eco-
nomic crisis. In regional comparison, Sri 
Lanka coped with the pandemic relatively 
well. By mid-August there were fewer than 
3,000 infected and only 11 dead. However, 
the slump in tourism and remittances has 
further exacerbated the economic situation. 
Thanks to its two-thirds majority in par-
liament, the SLPP will be able to keep one 
of its election promises – a new constitu-
tion – presumably without much resist-
ance. Prime Minister Rajapakse has already 
announced his intention to reverse the cur-
tailment of the president’s powers, which 
was implemented in the 19th amendment 
to the constitution. 
In June 2020, President Rajapakse set up 
two task forces, which presumably indicate 
the future direction of the constitution, and 
thus new domestic political lines of con-
flict. The first task force is to promote the 
Buddhist heritage in the Eastern Province. 
The Rajapakse family enjoys strong support 
from the Buddhist-nationalist clergy, which 
is claiming further rights for the “holy land 
of Buddhism” in the new constitution. The 
rebuilding of Buddhist temples in the 
Eastern Province will revive in a new form 
the conflict that has been smouldering for 
decades between the Tamil minority and 
the Sinhala majority. This could also affect 
the Muslim minority, whose main settle-
ment area is in this province. In recent 
years, tensions between Buddhists and Mus-
lims have increased. Reservations against 
Muslims have increased further since a 
local branch of the “Islamic State”, whose 
leaders came from the Eastern Province, 
carried out attacks on Easter Sunday 2019 
in which more than 250 people were killed. 
The second task force, composed mainly 
of members of the army, police, and intel-
ligence services, will be dedicated to build-
ing a “safe country, a disciplined, virtuous 
and just society”. President Gotabaya Raja-
pakse, former defence minister, has already 
filled senior administrative positions with 
a number of former military officers. This 
threatens a “securitisation” of Sri Lankan 
democracy and a resurgence of the authori-
tarian tendencies observed during the last 
term of Mahinda Rajapakse and his brothers, 
which lasted until 2015. 
Foreign Policy Challenges 
On the foreign policy front, the Rajapakse 
government will continue to try to find 
a balance in its relations with China and 
India. In 2019, China and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank were Sri Lanka’s largest 
creditors, each with 14 per cent. In 2017, 
the then-government had to lease the port 
of Hambantota in the south of the country 
to China for 99 years to settle debts. The 
district of the same name is the political 
home province of the Rajapakse family. 
In spring 2020, Sri Lanka received another 
loan from China in the amount of $500 
million to combat the effects of the pan-
demic. 
India is particularly involved in the 
reconstruction of the Tamil areas that suf-
fered in the civil war which ended in 2009. 
President Rajapakse’s statement that eco-
nomic development rather than political 
decentralisation is the solution to the prob-
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lems of the Tamils was also a setback for 
New Delhi. The 13th constitutional amend-
ment, co-initiated by India in 1987 as part 
of its efforts to settle the civil war, is still 
the political basis for greater Tamil self-
determination. 
The promotion of Buddhism in the East-
ern Province could, in connection with the 
Indo-Chinese rivalry, also give the Tamil 
conflict a new geopolitical dimension: for 
example, if Chinese infrastructure projects 
or Chinese-sponsored excavations of Bud-
dhist sites are carried out at the expense of 
Tamil smallholders or Hindu temples. Such 
a scenario would be particularly challeng-
ing for India, as Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi likes to present himself as 
a patron of Buddhism. 
The new political constellations will also 
put an end to the discussion on the investi-
gation of war crimes in the final phase of 
the civil war in spring 2009. A report by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(UN) in 2011 documented a number of war 
crimes committed by both the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan Army. At that time, the current 
president, Gotabaya Rajapakse, was the 
defence minister and responsible for the 
military actions of the armed forces, which 
was also directed against the civilian popu-
lation. In spring 2020, the then-government 
announced that it would continue to co-
operate with the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil, which has repeatedly discussed these 
issues. 
Outlook 
The clear democratic mandate and the 
weakness of the opposition are likely to 
pave the way for a new version of the 
authoritarian rule of the Rajapakse family 
observed from 2005 to 2015. Rarely before 
in Sri Lanka’s democratic development 
have the personal and political conflicts 
of the Sinhalese parties had such a strong 
impact on the political constellations with-
in the two largest minorities. Therefore, 
domestic political polarisation is likely to 
increase rather than decrease: between 
Singhalese parties, between the Singhalese 
majority and the minorities, and within 
the Tamil and Muslim minorities. 
On the foreign policy front, the new gov-
ernment will find a balance between India 
and China to revive Sri Lanka’s reconstruc-
tion and economic development. In view 
of the geopolitical rivalries, it is difficult for 
German and European politicians to exert 
any influence on domestic political devel-
opments. One lever is the regular review of 
the trade privileges Sri Lanka enjoys under 
the Generalized System of Preferences Plus. 
Among other things, the granting of these 
privileges is conditional on compliance 
with human rights and governance stand-
ards. Domestic political developments in 
Sri Lanka will therefore continue to require 
considerable attention in Berlin and Brus-
sels. 
Dr Christian Wagner is Senior Fellow in the Asia Division at SWP. 
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